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Air Cargo Security 
AIR CARGO SECURITY- THE COST OF DOING BUSINESS IN 
THE 21* CENTURY 
Kathleen M. Sweet 
"Sclence and technology is key to whning this new kind of war" Secretary of Homeland Security Tom 
Ridge (Press Release DHS, September 2004 
In the United States, the newly created Transportation Security Administration (TSA), as part of the larger 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has assumed overall responsibility for transportation security. The U.S. 
government has generally relied heavily on strategic partnerships with industry to reach their security goals. Other 
countries have followed suit. However, the Europeans and the Israeli's have been far less enthusiastic than the 
Americans in permitting the industry to police itself. Some air cargo security programs outside the U.S. are in the 
forefront, particularly European Union programs. All of these efforts, regardless of location, face long term 
transportation kcurity challenges that can seem daunting and sometimes insurmountable. This paper addresses the 
need to improve and enhance the Air Cargo security program in the U.S. and make it more seamless with international 
models. 
The government has justifiably claimed to have made points and U.S. borders. The intention is to create a multi- 
significant improvements in making the U.S. transportation layered position, so that if one defense measure breaks 
system more resistant to terrorist attacks. They have down, another can provide protection. 
repeatedly publicized the f& that since December 3 1,2002, 
100 % of baggage checked at the nation's 450 commercial 
ahports has been screened for explosives and other harmful 
materials before being loaded onto a plane. However, the 
strategy relating to air cargo security, not checked baggage, 
which is needed to mitigate remaining vulnerabilities must 
be addressed as soon as possible. Most aviation security and 
"operator" practitioners would agree that the level of 
security in this particular "air cargo" sector is little better 
than it was on or before September 11, in spite of a 
significant amount of money spent and the passage of 
numerous pieces of legislation. (GAO-03-344,2002) 
Current Legislated Efforts 
Many security upgrades such as reinforced cockpit 
doors and improved CCTV systems, have indeed been 
made, as noted by the bipartisan National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 
911 1 Commission. Congress has passed a number of bills, 
includingthe Aviation Transportation Security Act designed 
to prevent terrorists from attack'ing the U.S. transportation 
system or using the system to initiate new attacks. The 
administration also has taken a systematic approach, trying 
to extend the U.S. security zone beyond U.S. borders and 
building many layers of defense between foreign departwe 
In addition, the administration has invested in new 
technologies to prepare for new threats as terrorists' tactics 
and methods evolve. The current legislation mandates that 
TSA (1) Provide for screening of all property, cargo, cany- 
on and checked baggage, and other articles, that will be 
carried aboard passenger aircraft operated by a U.S. air 
carrier or foreign air carrier; and (2) Establish a system to 
screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the security of fkight 
that is to be transported in all cargo aircraft as soon as 
practicable. (49 USC 44901 (a); 49 USC 44901 (f)). The 
legislation has been implemented through regulations, 
Security Directives, and Emergency Amendments. Most 
recently, the DHS issued a proposed rule relating to Air 
Cargo Security Requirements which was published in the 
Federal Register on 10 November 2004. Numerous 
interested parties responded to the Notice of Proposed Rule 
Making. 
TSA Responsibilities 
In related efforts, the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) has been working on technologies 
ranging fiom sophisticated explosives-sniffing portals, 
"smart" tamper-resistant containers, and blast-resistant cargo 
containers for passenger planes. Currently, five airports are 
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testing the portals at passenger security checkpoints. This 
technology subjects passengers to puffs of air, which are 
collected and analyzed to determine if explosive residues are 
present. The pilot programs will help determine whether the 
trace detection technology is appropriate for use within an 
airport environment. These efforts are commendable but 
they do not address the issue of the cargo hold. One of the 
biggest disasters involving explosive cargo was the bombing 
of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie Scotland on December 
216, 1988. 
What is lacking is a strategic plan to provide for seamless 
transition fiom one transportation mode to another across 
numerous state and international boundaries which is also 
cost effective and not totally focused on passengers and 
carry on baggage. Commission Chairman Thomas Kean 
correctly pointed out in August 16, 2004 congressional 
testimony that, "In a h e  society we cannot protect 
everything everywhere, all the time, but they [ the American 
people] expect their government to make rational decisions 
about how to allocate limited resources." (Kean, 2004). 
TSA needs to correctly prioritize assets in order to 
accurately assess the proper allocation of resources. Air 
cargo security should be one of those priorities. 
Air Cargo Securig: T r e d ,  Policies and Problems 
As stated, the government has attempted to improve the 
screening of passengers and cany-on baggage but have yet 
to duplicate that effort in the area of air cargo security or 
among other means of transportation. Americans would do 
well to review the European models in formulating a viable 
air cargo security methodology. The International Civil 
Aviation Organkation's security plan is contained in Annex 
17. It addresses all aspects of aviation security but Chapter 
4, (4.5.1 through 4.5.4) directly relates to "cargo and mail 
and other goods transported on international passenger 
flights." Chapter 4 of Anuex 17 requires that each 
contracting State ensures that appropriate measures are 
taken to protect cargo, baggage, mail stores and operators' 
supplies being moved within an airport and intended for 
carriage on an aircraft. The cargo must be subjected to 
appropriate security controls at several points in the 
manufacturer to consumer logistics chain. 
U.S. airlines operating outside the U.S. must rely on 
the Eact the airport and the connecting carrier comply with 
the ICAO recommendations and rules. Admittedly, there is 
no guarantee and it is a calculated risk that what is loaded in 
foreign ahports is safe. In contrast to U.S. regulations 
however, each contracting State must establish measures to 
ensure, that "operators do not accept consignments of cargo, 
courier and express parcels or mail for carriage on passenger 
flights unless the security of each consignment has been 
reviewed by a designated agent." (Annex 17,453) Until 
such a program is implemented in the United States, the 
opportunities for a terrorist to access the cargo hold of an 
aircraft are limited only by the imagination of the terrorist.. 
For example, the shipper could be shipping under a non 
existent company name or a hollow paper company, the 
fieight forwarder could be unregistered, the trucking 
company delivering the cargo to the airport could be false, 
the driver of the truck could be a terrorist or the shipping 
documents could be forged. In other words, the means to 
circumvent the "known shipper rules" currently in effect in 
the US needs bolstering. 
The U.S. Congress had been unsuccessful in passing 
a competent and comprehensive air cargo security 
regulatory plan. Senators Kay Bailey Hutchiison and Diane 
Feinstein on 15 January 2003 did introduce an air cargo bill 
into the Senate (S. 165). It sought to amend P.L. 107-7 1, the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The bill was 
nearly identical to a bill submitted the year before by former 
Chairman Ernest Hollings and Senator McCain which failed 
in the 107" Congress. The bill, finally passed in the Senate 
in December 2003, intended to impose additional 
responsibilities on the TSA. In general, it required the TSA 
to regularly inspect air shipping facilities, expand the 
Federal Flight Deck Officer Program to cargo pilots, 
establish an industry-wide database of cargo shippers and 
create a security training program for air cargo handlers. In 
accordance with paragraph 11 (a) of Rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate and Section 403 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation committee determined that the cost of 
implementing the bill will be $4 17 million over the period 
2004-2008. Additionally, the bill required the TSA to 
establish a system for regular inspections of shipping 
facilities that handle air cargo to ensure that appropriate 
security protocols are followed. Currently, the TSA employs 
about 50 cargo security inspectors. In order to inspect every 
air cargo facility only once a year would require the 
employment of an additional 500 inspectors. (Senate Report 
108-038 - Air Cargo Security Improvement Act., 2003). 
Clearly, this is an area where the private sector could be 
hired as designated agents similar to the programs in 
Europe. Unfortunately, the bill was referred to the House 
where it did not pass and was never signed into law. 
Supplementing this effort, the TSA was to create a 
security training program for air cargo handlers. 
Specifically, Section 5 "requires the Under Secretary of 
Transportation for Security to establish a training program 
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for any persons that handle air cargo to ensure that the cargo 
is properly handled and safe-guarded fiom security 
breaches." (Air Cargo Security Improvement Act, 2003) 
The section refers to all cargo aircraft and passenger aircraft 
canying freight. However, passenger aircraft canying 
fr~ight currently provide only a small percentage of U.S. 
passenger airline revenues. For example, American Airlines 
reported $72 1 million in cargo revenue for 2000, out oftotal 
revenue of $19.7 billion. Consequently, as a general rule, air 
carriers generate approximately 3-4% of total revenue fiom 
cargo. (American Airlines Stockholder's Quarterly Report, 
2001) I 
The bill would have also required that TSA establish an 
industry wide database of air cargo shippers that use 
passenger air&. According to the FAA, more than 50 
commercial air carriers presently transport cargo on 
passenger aircrak (FAA Administrator's Handbook, 2005) 
Keeping the database current would have been particularly 
difficult and would constantly have needed to be updated; 
incurring an approximate cost of $10 million a year. This 
cost is part of the $417 million mentioned above for 
implementation. More importantly the bill obliged air 
carriers that operate all cargo aircraft to establish and 
implement a security plan specifically related to cargo. 
Further Requirements 
The Under Secretary for Transportation was to be tasked 
with establishing the standards. Officially known as the Air 
Cargo Security Improvement Act, Section 7 also instructed 
the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a report 
within 90 days to the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation and the House of 
Representatives Committee on Transportation and 
Mastructure on the potential impacts of the TSA's 
proposed program. Several other reports were also 
proscribed. Section 11 instructed the TSA and FAA to 
jointly submit a report evaluating blast resistant cargo 
container technology and Section 13 requested a report to 
best defend turbo and jet passenger aircraft h m  Man- 
Portable Air Defense Systems. 
Regardless of the fact that Congress believed the bill will 
have no adverse impact on the economy, the industry argued 
against any changes which would incur spending additional 
money, especially since they perceived the measures as not 
generating revenue and reduce profits. The government 
rationalized that because the bill addressed measures to 
protect the overall cargo system that business would 
naturally want to comply. The whole effort is currently at a 
standstill. Many believe that, due to assumed cost 
considerations, full cargo screening for passenger aircraft 
will never happen despite the glaring discrepancies between 
the screening of checked baggage and cargo. 
TSA's Strategic Plan 
As stated, the U.S. Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) did publicize a proposed plan in a 
November 17 press release. The plan responds to comments 
made in September 2003 by working groups of TSA's 
Aviation Security Advisory Committee, as well as 
recommendations from the General Accounting Office and 
the Department of Transportation's Ofice of Inspector 
General. The Strategic Plan supports the Notice of Proposed 
Rule Making (49 CFR Part 1540 et.al.) and is intended 
tocomplement security programs and initiatives. 
Transportation Security Administrator Admiral James Loy 
said that the main objective of the air cargo strategic plan is 
to provide an effective m e w o r k  that does not "unduly 
impede the flow of commerce." m y ,  2003) 
Specifically, TSA announced that the plan called for 
prescreening all cargo shipments to identify suspicious 
cargo, inspecting all such cargo, establishing a data base of 
vetted "known" shippers, banning cargo from unknown 
shippers and strengthening the security of the air cargo 
operating areas at airports as well as the security standards 
for air cargo personnel. In another November 17, 2003, 
news release, TSA advised that domestic and foreign 
commercial planes canying cargo will be subject to random 
inspections on fights within, into and out of the United 
States. 
TSA maintains that the first main objective of the 
Strategic Plan calls for augmentation of TSA's Known 
Shipper Program, which prohibits air carriers firom accepting 
cargo that does not originate h m  shippers who meet TSA's 
Known Shipper requirements. The plan provides for full 
deployment of the program's Known Shipper Automated 
Database and Indirect Air Camer Database, which will 
allow TSA and air carriers to have faster access and more 
thorough information on applicants for Known Shipper 
status and those seeking to ship cargo aboard passenger 
aircraft. 
A second component of the Strategic Plan is the 
development of a cargo pre-sawning system similar to that 
used at national borders. TSA intends to use terrorist watch 
lists and federal and commercial databases to identify 
suspicious or higher risk shipments. From this they will 
develop a "risk score" for cargo shipments. TSA is working 
closely with Customs and Border Protection to build on 
existing pre-screening technology in place in the maritime 
industry. 
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TSA Technological Solutions passenger flights, closing yet another loophole in providing 
TSA will accelerate research and development of adequate security controls on cargo. 
technological solutions and new inspections protocols for 
inspecting air cargo as the third component of its Strategic 
Plan. Using $55 million provided in fiscal year 2004, TSA 
assessed the viability of using explosive detection systems, 
currently used to screen passenger baggage, or other systems 
that might have the potential to detect threats in air cargo. 
Technology development efforts will be augmented by 
deployment of canines in the cargo environment for the 
development of new inspection protocols. TSA is currently, 
conducting pilot programs using cauhe teams to inspect 
certain classes of mail at 1 1 airports and in the inspection of 
general cargo at six airports. TSA's Strategic Plan also 
focuses on strategies to secure air cargo perimeters, 
facilities, equipment and personnel. Enhanced background 
checks on persons who have access to cargo or cargo 
aircraft and required screening of passengers aboard cargo 
planes are among many measures that are supposed to be 
adopted. 
Specifically, the, "Air Cargo Security Requirements: 
Proposed Rule" in the Federal Register, Section IV of the 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) addresses each of 
the proposed changes to 49 CFR Parts 1540-1548 
summarized above. The Federal Register specifically states 
that, "The major objectives of the program are to prevent 
passenger and large all cargo aircraft fiom being used as 
weapons and to prevent unauthorized explosives h m  being 
carried aboard, and potentially detonated, during flight." 
The rule proposes a Standard Security Program for all-cargo 
aimaft operators utilizing aimaft with a take-off weight of 
over 45,000 kg. Unfortunately, the program falls short of 
the requirements in place in Europe. 
Historically Unsuccessful Efforts 
Some air carriers and some indirect air carriers have 
experienced difficulty identifying "unknown shippers" in 
order properly to review all shipping documents. The FAA 
had extended the previous "unknown shipper" rules to all 
cargo and had required inspection of cargo fiom all these 
"unknown shippers" prior to 911 1. Passenger air carriers 
were required to obtain a Shipper's Security Endorsement 
and identification check for all cargo. Prior to that, these 
endorsements had only been needed for cargo; again only 
fiom b'unkn~wn shippers". In addition, foreign air carriers 
and i n d a  air carriers were also required to obtain similar 
information fiom all shippers known or unknown and to 
certify each shipment had an audit trail. On top of this, the 
FAA also required air carriers to apply security controls to 
cargo accepted fiom all-cargo flights as well as the 
Consequently, the responsibility to inspect cargo has 
historically been in the hands of the airlines. They were 
regulated by the former Federal Aviation Regulations Part 
108. This was prior to 9/11 and the transfer of security 
responsibilities to the Transportation Security 
Administration, which had implemented similar rules 
contained in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations. 
However, little has been done to actually secure the cargo 
hold since the 1970's. The airlines were required to "check" 
the checked and wry on luggage as well as cargo. How to 
define "check" was wide open to interpretation. Aircraft 
were required to be inspected after they had been left 
unattended and carriers were required to check the 
identification of unknown shippers. Known shippers were 
apparently fiee to do as they wished. The attitude was 
irresponsible and remains so today. 
Specifically, FAR 108.13 (b) required the baggage 
carried in an airplane be checked by a responsible agent and 
that identification be obtained fiom all persons, other than 
known shippers, who seek to ship goods or cargo aboard the 
airplane. Section (c) required the carrier to ensure that cargo 
and checked baggage carried aboard the airplane was 
handled in a manner that prohibits unauthorized access. 
Furthermore, Subparagraph (d) mandated that the airline 
conduct a security inspection of the airplane before placing 
it in service and after it has been left unattended. 
The above regulations did not really explain how to 
secure cargo. Each airline and every ahport had an 
individual set of guidelines. The job is massive but in 
today's environment the consequences of unattended 
baggage can be quite serious. The distinction between 
checked baggage and cargo is significant. Checked baggage 
is now technically to be scanned by explosive detection 
machines or appropriate other means. Cargo on the other 
hand has no such protection, even under the proposed rule. 
Arguably cargo is one of the most vulnerable points in the 
supply chain. The ramifications of neglect will likely be 
quite grim. Appropriate access control procedures to the 
flight line and unattended cargo and cargo holds are not only 
essential but also represent a common sense approach to 
security. 
Need for Continuous Supply Chain Control 
The key concept is continuous control. Any break in 
the chain supplies the terrorists with access. Once the airline 
accepts baggage at the check-in counter, or at curbside, it is 
usually placed on a conveyor belt where it is t m n s p o ~  to 
a centralized sorting facility. It is not reasonable to inspect 
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every piece of baggagelcargo every second; but restricting 
access to the cargo will reduce both pilferage and 
unauthorized tampering. Newer technology will be capable 
of actually tracking each bag. Any casual observer at an 
airport can visually see that baggage in transit on an airfield 
is*not sealed. Sometimes it is not even protected h m  the 
weather, let alone secured. Just restricting the public to the 
cargohaggage area is insufficient. This is an area where the 
prescreening of employees and stringent access control 
standards are essential. It does not matter if every single 
piece of cargo has been screened or manually inspected if a 
nefarious employee who has access decides to tamper with 
it. 
Unaccompanied baggage also presents some distinct 
cargo problems. There are many legitimate reasons why 
unaccompanied bags do not present a threat, but there are 
many more reasons to assume that they do in today's threat 
environment. Baggage does get separated &om its owner 
either by negligence on the part of the airlines, a passenger 
missing a connecting flight or baggage being carried 
inadvertently without any reconciliation with the passenger. 
More importantly, the separation may be deliberate causing 
a hazard to flight or for the illegal movement of drugs or 
other contraband. These instances are highly significant if a 
terrorist operation is underway. 
After the Lockerbie tragedy, cargo finally became 
more of a priority. FAR 108.7 (b) (2) Security Programs: 
Form Content and Availability, required the air carrier 
security program to have the FAA approve, "the procedures 
and a description of the facilities and equipment used to 
perform the airplane and facilities control fimctions" in an 
attempt to standardii procedures. As stated, if the shipper 
was known, the airlines simply trusted that the cargo was 
safe. The definition of who was known and unknown 
remained at the discretion of the airlines. However, airlines, 
in the interests of making more profit were accepting cargo 
for carriage without really knowing the origination of the 
cargo. Hence the huge gap in security. 
Congressional Review 
Congress has asked for the issue of air cargo to be 
studied via several routes. In May 1998, a report earlier 
mandated by Congress was submitted in response to the 
requirement in Section 3 13 of Public Law 104-264 of the 
Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996. Section 3 13 
(a) stated that the Secretary of Transportation shall transmit 
to Congress a report, "on any changes recommended and 
implemented as a result of the White House Commission on 
Aviation Safety and Security to enhance and supplement 
screening and inspection of cargo, mail, and company- 
shipped materials transported in air commerce." That report 
pointed out some significant discrepancies that existed. 
They remain relatively unaddressed to date and include lack 
of adequate screening, insufficient training of personnel and 
failure to comply with the current known shipper rules. 
The Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) 
created the Baseline Working Group (B WG) in July 1 996 in 
an effort to strengthen the everyday ahport security efforts 
in place across the nation. It was created prior to the 
formation of the White House Commission on Aviation 
Safety and Security but its efforts were related to the 
recommendations of the Commission. The BWG also 
formed the Cargo Working Group to specifically deal with 
the unique problems related to air cargo. The groups were 
dissolved in December 1996 when the ASAC issued the 
ASAC Domestic Security Baseline Final Report. The 
President's Commission, assembled on 25 July 1996, also 
recommended that the FAA implement a comprehensive 
plan to address the threat of explosives and other threat 
objects aboard aircraft. In order to consolidate all the 
recommendations and views, the FAA requested that ASAC 
reconvene another CWG to be known as the Cargo Baseline 
Working Group. In 1997, this gmup published some 
expanded recommendations. 
Overall, the CBWG concluded that (1). The FAA 
should implement a comprehensive plan to address the 
threat of explosives and other threat objects in cargo and 
work with industry to develop new initiatives in this area. 
(2). The FAA should place greater emphasis on the work of 
teams such as the Aviation Security Advisory Committee 
and the Baseline Cargo Working Group, to address cargo 
issues. The FAA agreed with the two recommendations and 
had pursued further cooperative efforts with the Postal 
Service, the U.S. Customs Service and the air carriers. 
In March 2004, the Aviation Security Advisory 
Committee that had been established after the Lockerbie 
incident in 1988 and is still functioning, submitted a 
significant amount of material to Congress on formulating 
an effective cargo security program. The TSA had stated 
they intended to use the recommendations as a strategic 
plan. The report was released to the public in October 2003 
and advocates enhancing ramp and perimeter security, 
screening employees with access to cargo areas and parked 
aircraft, improving database and information sharing 
capabilities and researching new cargo screening 
technology. The ASAC failed to go so far as to recommend 
100% inspection of air cargo or the bsnning of cargo on 
passenger planes; citing reasons of impossibility given the 
volume involved. The new proposed rule perpetuates this 
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philosophy. 
During 1995, the FAA started a new national data base 
to record air carrier and airport inspection data. The program 
developed into the Air Carrier and Airport Inspection 
Reporting System (AAIRS). This is not to be confused with 
the Adaptive, Agent-based Intrusion Response System. The 
AAIR system records all aspects of an air carrier's security 
obligations, including cargo security requirements. It 
currently serves a worldwide user community of 
approximately 900 people. The Security Information 
Reference System (SIRS) is an internet based system that 
provides its members access to tbe most current FAA 
policies, directives, and other needed information. In 
addition to terrorism, one of the greatest threats to aircraft 
safety is the unauthorized shipment of hazardous andlor 
dangerous cargo. Shippers often attempt to ship such 
dangerous cargo mixed in permissible cargo. The purpose is 
to bolster the known shipper program as well as the 
requirements for so-called "unknown shippers." 
Cooperation with Customs and Border Protecrion 
Air cargo is still distinctly vulnerable under the current 
process. The United States and the European Union share 
the vision that civil aviation functions best when market 
principles govern and air carriers, not governments, decide 
where to fly, how often, and at what price. On September 
20, 2004, in prepared remarks to the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs in London, Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) Commissioner Robert Bonner said that 
because al-Qaeda and other terrorist o ~ t i o n s  target not 
only the United States but also other countries, the 
international community needs to "promptly1' turn the 
principal features of proven U.S. efforts to increase 
transportation security without impeding trade flows into 
international standards. (Bonner, 2004). He suggested that 
the World Customs Organization (WCO) should lead this 
effort. The WCO indirectly endorsed part of his approach 
when it decided in June 2004 to support development of 
universal standards for security and trade facilitation based 
on the main features of the Customs-Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program. Bonner presented 
the global war on terrorism as a conhntation between the 
civilized modernity and backward-looking Islamic radicals. 
He said that radical Islam is, "yearning to return to the 
world of the seventh and eight century and a pan-Islamic 
fundamentalist state," that is why terrorists are attacking the 
global economy and globalization that leads to economic 
development, democratization, and, "yes, probably 
increased secularization." He compared the terrorist threat 
to the challenge of communism and said that the war on 
terrorism could last as long as the Cold War, and said that 
the United States and its partners can win this new war just 
as they triumphed over communism. (Bonner, 2004) 
Additionally, CBP had announced in March 2004 that the 
Federal Register revised implementation dates for the 
transmission of inbound air cargo data required under the 
Trade Act of 2002 cargo security rules would be extended 
until August 2004. The original implementation date had 
been March 4,2004. "The new schedule will allow CBP to 
modify certain critical aspects of Air AMS (Automated 
Manifest System), train all CBP officers that process 
imported air cargo on those changes, and certify the 
sofhvare of new participants," CBP completed the necessary 
changes in May 2004, which was followed by a 90-day 
certification-testing period. (Bonner, 2004). 
The Business of Business Is Business 
A tke market philosophy could be stated as; the business 
of business is business, not homeland security. "Privat'e 
markets will not often provide adequate protection against 
terrorist attack on their own, since individual citizens and 
businessman tend to wony more about the immediate 
challenge of making a profit than about the extremely 
unlikely possibilities that their facilities will be attacked." 
(O'Hanlon, M.E, 2003) 
In this new era of continuous danger, the new security 
regulations are supposed to erect new and higher barriers 
between terrorists and supply chains not customers and 
supply chains. The impending rules are raising new 
concerns over their ability to offer time sensitive services 
and revealing stark divisions over who will pay for better 
security? The concept of "level playing field" and questions 
of cost invariably come up when the discussion of additional 
regulations are mentioned. "Terrorism is directed at a state, 
it is not generally directed at the service industries of civil 
aviation," stated John Goldsworthy, chairman of the 
European Express Association Security Committee, in an 
address to the World Mail & Express Europe Conference in 
Amsterdam. He continued "The EEA fully supports the 
concept of air cargo security regulation. However, it does 
not support the governmental view that the costs of all 
security measures should be borne by industry." 
(Goldsworthy, 2002) The basic response to the cost issue is 
to pass the costs along to the consumer. The markets 
willingness to bear these additional costs is a subject yet to 
be fully comprehended h m  an air cargo perspective. 
Air Cargo and Eeonomic Development 
A report commissioned by The Intemational Air Cargo 
Association (TIACA) titled "Air Cargo: Engine for 
Economic Development", presents an analysis of the role 
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played by air cargo in international trade, commerce and 
cross-border manufacturing. "Air Cargo enables nations, 
regardless of location, to efficiently connect to distant 
markets and global supply chains in a speedy, reliable 
manner. The huge volume of high-value, time-critical 
p~oducts traversing international boundaries by air has 
resulted in air cargo accounting for 40 % of the value of 
today's world trade," (Dora Kay, 2004) 
According to the "Boeing World Air Cargo Forecast 
200412005", economic activity, as measured by gross 
domestic product (GDP), it remains the primary driver for 
air cargo industry growth. World air cargo traffic will 
expand at an average annual rate of 6.2% for the next two 
decades, lripling current traffic levels. The report goes on to 
mention some of the on going profit challenges at passenger 
airlines and how they have focused attention on lower-hold 
revenue cargo (hight mixed with passenger baggage) 
market opportunities. Cargo revenue represents, on average, 
15% of total traffic revenues with some airlines aiming to 
earn well over half of their revenue from this source. As 
mentioned in the "Boeing World Air Cargo Forecast 
2004/2005: Of all recent industry developments, 
government-mandated security regulations present the 
highest potential for adverse impact upon the air cargo 
industry. They may have debilitating effects on shipment 
transit time. The industry must be diligent in working with 
authorities to realize security enhancements that are 
balanced with a time sensitive industry's realities. 
"The costs associated with the new security measures are 
likely to be significant. The success of such activities 
cannot be measured by the values they deliver to customers, 
employees or shareholders day in and day out. Instead, 
these measures will be most successful if they are never 
actually tested." (Sheffi, 2001) One group of scholars as 
additionall suggested that, "The basic question is whether 
the federal role should be restricted to setting and 
monitoring security standards or whether the role should 
also include financing and implementation." (Coughlin, 
Cohen, Khan, 2002). Combining these thoughts, the new 
realities of air cargo security are going to require a 
government-private partnership that is respectful of trade 
partnerships and is not overly burdensome with respect to 
costs, global and intra-modal. 
Air Cargo Security 
Conclusion 
It is clear that the Proposed Rules do much to codify 
already existing air cargo security protocols. However, it 
does not go far enough. The door remains open and 
unfortunately, the proposed rules, though exhibiting a 
formalization of needed standards, falls far short of 
protecting the public tkom the introduction of hazardous 
materials into the cargo hold. The government needs to go 
much further in mandating screening of cargo and tracking 
the load fiom manufacturer to consumer. Simply targeting 
high risk cargo fosters the concept of cost effectiveness, but 
does little to set the standard as a truly protective measure. 
Recommendations 
1. Institute a "designated agent" program similar to 
the air cargo security programs currently 
functioning successllly in the European Union 
and the United Kingdom. 
2. Refocus on developing technology that can 
accurately scan bulk cargo on a sufficient 
throughput basis so as not to impede the h e  flow 
of commerce. 
3. Continue and enhance the working relationship 
between cargo carriers and the U.S. Postal Service. 
4, Adjust efforts to scrutinize and hi only qualified 
and trustworthy employees to handle cargo. 
5. Exercise increased efforts to monitor improve and 
tighten the "known" and "unknown shipper" 
pl'ograms- 
Furthermore, the cargo industry needs to embrace a robust 
air cargo security effort. The proof that such programs are 
workable and that a nation wide implementation of a 
designated agent system will not place an unnecessary 
burden on commerce, has already been evidenced by its 
successful execution in Europe. .+ 
Thispaper was written with the assistance of Can Sur who 
hascompletedhis Masters ofscience in Aviation Technology 
at Purdue University. He completed a Bachelor of Science 
in Aviation Management and a Bachelor of Science in 
Aeronautical Science with Flightji-om Florida Institute of 
Technology in 2003. His Turkivh and French origins have 
stimulated his interest in global aviation issues such as 
aviation human factors, sgety perfrmance and security. 
The paper was also edited by Matthew R Young, a graduate 
student in the Department oflndustrial Technology, Purdue 
University. 
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